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Abstract—Fuzz Testing is a largely automated testing technique
that provides random and unexpected input to a program in
attempt to trigger failure conditions. Much of the research
conducted thus far into Fuzz Testing has focused on developing
improvements to available Fuzz Testing tools and frameworks in
order to improve efficiency. In this paper however, we instead
look at a way in which we can reduce the amount of developer
time required to integrate Fuzz Testing to help maintain an
existing codebase. We accomplish this with a new technique for
automatically generating Fuzz Targets, the modified versions of
programs on which Fuzz Testing tools operate. We evaluated
three different Fuzz Testing solutions on the codebase of our
industry partner and found a fully automated solution to result
in significantly more bugs found with respect to the developer
time required to implement said solution. Our research is an
important step towards increasing the prevalence of Fuzz Testing
by making it simpler to integrate a Fuzz Testing solution for
maintaining an existing codebase.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is nearly impossible to write flawless code for anything
but the simplest of problems. During any development process,
mistakes are made, and bugs get introduced into the code.
These bugs can be anything from simple, unintended but
benign behaviour, to serious security vulnerabilities that an
attacker could use to gain control of the entire system upon
which the software is being run. It is because of this that
testing is one of the most vital components of software
development, and on large scale codebases, finding ways of
automating the testing process is invaluable [6].
Fuzz Testing or Fuzzing is a specific type of automated
testing that provides invalid or unexpected data as an input
to a target program and then monitors for any exceptions or
crashes which that input produces. One often used method
of automated Fuzz Testing is through the use of a coverage
guided tool such as libFuzzer or American Fuzzy Lop (AFL).
These two tools take an input corpus and, using genetic algo-
rithms [7], apply random mutations to that corpus selecting for
inputs that find new paths through the code. Between them,
these tools have found thousands of bugs and vulnerabilities in
many commonly used applications and libraries [2], [9], [13].
These tools are a useful addition to any test suite, but most
programs cannot be immediately fuzzed, ‘as is’. In most cases
it is necessary to build a Fuzz Target, a modified version of the
program designed to work with the selected fuzzing tool [9]. In
the case of AFL, such a Fuzz Target is simply a program that
reads an input from stdin, performs some operations on that
input, and then exits. For libFuzzer, a specific function needs to
be implemented that takes an input, performs some operations
on it, and then cleans up after itself. Using either of these two
tools, or anything similar, will require a developer to spend
time creating these Fuzz Targets. Conventional wisdom is to
keep Fuzz Targets small and fuzz single pieces of functionality
at a time. For instance, to Fuzz Test a tool that accepts input
in several different formats, it would likely be most efficient
to build an individual Fuzz Target for each format [9]. This is
because this method reduces the input space for each target,
causing each random mutation of the fuzzing tool to have
a better chance of finding a new code path. For small scale
projects, creating these Fuzz Targets may not involve much
work, as there is potentially as few as one Fuzz Target that
would need to be made. However, for large codebases there
could potentially be hundreds of different locations in the code
that could benefit from being Fuzz Tested. Also, in order
to create a Fuzz Target, the developer needs to have a firm
understanding of both the code for which they are building
the target and the Fuzz Testing framework they are using.
Realistically, an organisation with an existing codebase, that
wishes to add Fuzz Testing to its existing test suite, will need
to spend extra time teaching developers how to build these
Fuzz Targets.
In this paper we explore automated generation of Fuzz
Targets as a way to reduce the barrier to entry for setting up
Fuzz Testing to maintain an existing codebase, in an attempt
to incentivise companies to implement additional testing prac-
tices. We developed a tool to generate a libFuzzer compatible
Fuzz Target based on a set of given function signatures in a
piece of C code, and compare the performance of those Fuzz
Targets to that of more conventional fuzzing methodologies
as described below. The tool developed can be used on any
codebase written in C, but will be most effective in comparison
to traditional Fuzz Testing methods on larger codebases for
which a comprehensive set of Fuzz Targets could not quickly
be created manually.
The codebase used in this work was the protocol stack of our
industry partner Cohda Wireless. Cohda Wireless is a global
leader in the development of Connected Autonomous Vehicle
software with proven applications for Smart City, Mining978-1-7281-2968-6/19/$31.00 ©2019 IEEE
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and other environments. Cohda is headquartered in Australia
and has offices in Europe, China, and the USA. Cohda
Wireless’s innovative software solutions enable connected
vehicles and connected autonomous vehicles to communicate
with other vehicles and with Smart City infrastructure. These
connections span Vehicle-to-Vehicle, Vehicle-to-Infrastructure,
and Vehicle-to-Pedestrian (collectively called V2X), allowing
CAVs to ‘talk’ to each other, Smart Cities, and vulnerable
road users in order to avoid accidents, reduce congestion,
and be more efficient. Because of this, much of the code
in this stack is safety critical, increasing the necessity to
ensure that it is adequately tested. At the time of writing, the
stack contains 300,000 lines of code and 17,000 functions. It
utilises a continuous integration pipeline, regularly running a
comprehensive suite of unit and application tests, to ensure the
continued reliability of the code, and to prevent regression.
Because of the size of this codebase, retroactively adding
comprehensive Fuzz Testing would require a considerable
amount of effort and resources. This makes the codebase an
ideal candidate for this work, as it would be of considerable
benefit, both in terms of developer time and code quality, if
the addition of Fuzz Testing could be largely automated.
We tested two different approaches utilising Fuzz Targets
generated in a semi-automated and fully automated manner
against the standard approach of building Fuzz Targets man-
ually. We found both of these approaches to result in signif-
icantly more bugs found for the same amount of developer
time required to implement them.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Fuzz Testing can trace its origins to as early as the 1950s
when it was common practice to test programs using decks of
punch cards chosen at random or recovered from the trash
in order to find undesired behaviours [11]. For some time
this type of testing was thought to be an ineffective means
of testing programs until the practice of testing programs
with random inputs was formally investigated by Duran and
Ntafos [4], who found random testing to be a viable and cost
effective testing practice.
There has been a lot of research into fuzzing from a
theoretical standpoint. This research has been primarily in the
development of new and effective tools, or optimisation of the
performance of currently existing tools. Such developments
include AFL by Zalewski [14], a fuzzer which employs genetic
algorithms to efficiently increase code coverage of test cases.
Research into optimisation includes work by Rebert et al. [8],
who investigate optimising the seed corpus for the fuzzer in
order to maximise the total number of bugs found over a fixed
timeframe. Another work is from Xu et al. [12] that focuses
on developing improved operating primitives that decrease the
execution time of each iteration of the fuzzer.
While they are valuable contributions, a perspective on Fuzz
Testing research that is not usually taken is how best to apply
Fuzz Testing techniques to existing codebases, particularly
when these codebases are large, as would be found in an
industry context. There is some work being done with respect
to Continuous Fuzzing, the process of running Fuzz Tests ei-
ther periodically, when new revisions are committed to version
control, or some combination of both. An example of this
is Google’s OSS-Fuzz [3], a continuous fuzzing framework
for open-source software. OSS-Fuzz takes any open source
software that is widely used, or part of core infrastructure,
and, using Fuzz Targets created by each open source project’s
maintainers, runs Fuzz Tests on ClusterFuzz, Google’s dis-
tributed fuzzing infrastructure [1].
III. TARGET GENERATOR
To enable our industry partner to integrate a Fuzz Testing
solution into their existing testing framework, we developed
Fuzz Target Generator (FTG), a tool for automatically gener-
ating Fuzz Targets to be used with libFuzzer. Unlike existing
tools, Fuzz Target Generator is capable of producing Fuzz Test
ready code directly from an existing codebase without the need
for additional input from a developer. We describe the design
of Fuzz Target Generator in the following paragraphs.
To build a Fuzz Target for libFuzzer in C, a developer
needs to implement the function in Listing 1 that performs
some operation on an input array and link the libFuzzer
library which contains a main function that will call the target
repeatedly with each new input generated from the mutated
seed corpus.
i n t LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput ( u i n t 8 t * da t a ,
s i z e t s i z e )
Listing 1: libFuzzer input function for C
The primary challenge is serialising the parameter list of the
function so that all the necessary data to call the function can
be mapped to a single contiguous input buffer. This allows the
array of uint8_t passed to the Fuzz Target by libFuzzer to
be split up into all the necessary variables needed to call the
target function. This should be a reasonably simple task for
any function signature containing only basic types or structures
containing only basic types. Function signatures containing
arrays should also be possible if it can be indicated to the
tool which value is the array and which is its corresponding
length. More complex structures however, such as structures
containing pointers to other structures, are more difficult to
serialise. While possible in most cases, such structures are not
considered in this work yet.
In the following, we describe the cases which FTG can
handle in more detail. First, consider the function signature
containing a structure in Listing 2.
s t r u c t Foo {
i n t x ;
c h a r y ;
f l o a t z ;
}
/ / @ f u z z t e s t
vo id func1 ( i n t a , i n t b , s t r u c t Foo f ) {
. . .
}
Listing 2: Function signature containing structure
Fig. 1: Serialised input for func1
The parameter list can be serialised with relative ease as is
shown in Figure 1, as all of the parameters are simple types
or structures containing only simple types, and thus, calling
sizeof will return the exact number of bytes that need to
be allocated for that type in the input format. The commented
line above the function declaration contains an @fuzztest
directive, which is used to indicate to the target generator that
a Fuzz Target should be generated for the following function.
This directive is part of FTG and will be described in detail
in the next section. Next consider the function in Listing 3
containing an array and its length.
/ / @ f u z z t e s t Array ( a r r , l e n )
vo id func2 ( i n t * a r r , i n t l e n ) {
. . .
}
Listing 3: Function call with array
Using the same approach as above, this signature would be
serialised as shown in Figure 2.
Fig. 2: Naive serialised input for func2
We would be naive to serialise func2 in this way as it would
result in an array of size one and a length determined by the
input data from libFuzzer being passed to the target function.
A Fuzz Target reading inputs in this format will not be very
effective as it is unlikely that a function that takes an array will
have much of its functionality tested when only arrays of size
one are passed. It is also possible that false positive bugs could
be found due to the array size not matching the actual length
of the array passed. However, if we were able to indicate to
the tool that these two values should instead be considered
an array and its length, such as by using an additional Array
parameter in the @fuzztest directive in the snippet above,
we could instead serialise the signature as shown in Figure 3.
Fig. 3: Accurate serialised input for func2
A Fuzz Target reading inputs in this format is going to be
able to consider a much wider range of inputs and as such,
is likely to be much more effective. This is because arrays of
lengths other than one can be passed to the target function and
the array length passed will be accurate.
Once we have created an input format that can be mapped
to the function signature, it is simply a matter of generating a
Fuzz Target that can separate out each part of the input into
a correctly typed variable, and then pass all those variables to
the function being tested. However, this is more complicated
than it may seem. With libFuzzer the input is treated as an
array of uint8_t, a type with a size of one byte, thus for
any type of a larger size, multiple values from the input array
need to be treated as the same value when being passed to the
target function. libFuzzer Fuzz Targets for the first function
described above could look as shown in Listing 4.
i n t LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput ( u i n t 8 t * da t a ,
s i z e t s i z e )
i n t a = 0 ;
c h a r b = 0 ;
s t r u c t Foo myFoo ;
u i n t 8 t * pos = d a t a ;
memcpy(&a , pos , s i z e o f ( i n t ) ) ;
pos += s i z e o f ( i n t ) ;
memcpy(&b , pos , s i z e o f ( c h a r ) ) ;
pos += s i z e o f ( c h a r ) ;
memcpy(&myFoo , pos , s i z e o f ( Foo ) ) ;
func1 ( a , b , myFoo ) ;
r e t u r n 0 ;
}
Listing 4: Generated Fuzz Target for func1
This code utilises memcpy in order to map the smaller
values of the uint8_t array onto the larger values of int
and Foo.
IV. TOOL USAGE
To mark a selected function to have a Fuzz Target generated
a user needs to add the @fuzztest directive in a commented
line directly above the function. By default this will generate
a Fuzz Target that allocates an amount of data from the
libFuzzer input buffer to each parameter equal to the size
of that parameter’s type. This behaviour can be modified for
specific parameters using the additional directives listed below.
A. Array(array ptr, array len)
This directive indicates two values that should be treated
as an array, rather than individual parameters as they would
by default. The array is placed at the end of the fuzzer input
format, and the Fuzz Target will pass any data remaining in the
input buffer after filling all the other parameters as the array.
Because of this, only one Array can currently be supported in
a single Fuzz Target.
• array_ptr: pointer to the start of the array
• array_len: parameter indicating the length of the array
Example
/ / @ f u z z t e s t Array ( pBuf , Len )
vo id foo ( c h a r * pBuf , i n t Len ) {
. . .
}
B. Value(parameter, value)
This directive indicates to use the same value for a given
parameter every time, instead of allowing it to be chosen by
the fuzzer. This is useful for disabling optional features such
as error pointers or to fix the value of flags or enums passed
to the target function. Fixing values allows more targeted
control over which code paths are explored, and reduces the
required input size, both of which increase the efficiency of
Fuzz Testing.
• parameter: parameter to be set
• value: value for the parameter to be set to
Example
/ / @ f u z z t e s t Value ( e , ENUM VALUE)
/ / Value ( pErr , NULL)
vo id foo ( i n t a , myEnum e , i n t * pEr r ) {
. . .
}
C. Output(parameter)
This directive marks a parameter as being used for output.
This will cause a variable to be initialised and passed to
the function being called, but will not initialise it using data
provided by the fuzzer. This reduces the required size of the
input, as if the parameter is never going to be read by the
target function, any data used to initialise it would be wasted.
• parameter: parameter to be marked as output
D. Cleanup(condition, function [, params])
This directive indicates to call a function to help clean
up the fuzzing run after the target function has been called.
This is most useful if the target function allocates memory
that needs to be freed by a separate function. An optional
condition is also available that will be evaluated to determine
if the clean-up function should be called. The special name
fuzzer_return_value can be used as part of the clean-
up to get the value returned by the target function. This
is useful as it prevents the Fuzz Target from creating false
positive memory leaks, as well as potentially obscuring real
bugs in the target function.
• condition: the condition to evaluate before calling the
clean-up function, can be empty
• function: the clean-up function to be called
• params: a list of parameters to be passed to the clean-up
function
Examples
/ / @ f u z z t e s t
/ / Cleanup ( , f r e e , f u z z e r r e t u r n v a l u e )
c h a r * a l loca te some memory (
i n t t h i s much ) {
. . .
}
/ / @ f u z z t e s t Outpu t ( o u t )
/ / Cleanup ( o u t != NULL, myTypeFree , o u t )
vo id m a y b e a l l o c a t e m e m o r y t o o u t p u t (
i n t th i s much , myType * o u t ) {
. . .
}
V. CASE STUDY
Once we were able to generate these Fuzz Targets, we
evaluated their performance and compared them against the
performance of a Fuzz Target that was hand-made by a
developer and utilises a quality seed corpus. This was done
as part of the case study with our industry partner.
For this evaluation, the performance metric we used was
the number of bugs found over a fixed period of time, namely
ten hours. We ran three different tests on the J2735 Decoding
module of our industry partner’s stack, on the same revision
within the version control system.
The three tested approaches are as follows, including the
number of Fuzz Targets created by that method, and the
amount of developer time used.
• Automated: 66 Fuzz Targets generated from every func-
tion for which the tool was able, without any additional
input from a developer.
Effort: This method took no additional time to set up,
outside of running the target generator and the ten hour
libFuzzer run time.
• Annotated: Six Fuzz Targets generated from functions
specifically marked with the @fuzztest directive and
any additional information, such as the Array parameter
described above, by a developer familiar with the code-
base, who was provided with the documentation listed
under the Tool Usage section above, on their discretion
of which functionality would benefit most from Fuzz
Testing.
Effort: This method took nominally five minutes to select
and annotate the chosen functions.
• Handmade: A single handmade Fuzz Target with in-
cluded seed corpus was run for the full ten hours.
Effort: This target took approximately one and a half
hours to create and gather the corpus for.
For the first and second test each Fuzz Target was run
using round-robin scheduling, which splits up the allotted time
equally between each target. Given a total number of Fuzz
Targets n and an allotted time period of T each target is
run for a total time of T/n. All experiments were run on
an Ubuntu 16.04 VM with a 2.6GHz Quad Core Intel i7-
6600U and six GB of RAM. All code was built using Clang
6.0 with AddressSanatizer. This allows the Fuzz Targets to
detect memory issues as well as crashes. AddressSanatizer
also has a feature that produces deduplication tokens in
its output that can be activated by setting the environment
variable ASAN_OPTIONS=dedup_token_length=3. In
some cases there could be a Fuzz Target that is capable
of taking a codepath into another function that has its own
Fuzz Target. This could result in two different Fuzz Targets
finding the exact same bug, but because AddressSanatizer’s
deduplication tokens are based on the stack trace, this will
allow it to handle the case in which two Fuzz Targets find
the same bug. It is important to note that in order to produce
deduplication tokens, AddressSanatizer needs to be able to
symbolise its stack traces. When building with Clang, this
TABLE I: Results (averaged across five runs)
Run Targets Distinct Unique Unique Total Bugs/
Bug Inputs Crashes Leaks Bugs Target
Automated 66 209,797.6 82.6 11 93.6 1.42
Annotated 6 82,258.8 6.8 3 9.8 1.66
Manual 1 73,465.0 1.8 3 4.8 4.8
means that AddressSanatizer needs to know where to find the
llvm-symbolizer binary corresponding to the version of Clang
used. This can either be done by adding it to $PATH or by set-
ting ASAN_OPTIONS=external_symbolizer_path=
/path/to/llvm-symbolizer. If this is not done, it will
be much more difficult to deduplicate any bugs found by
libFuzzer.
Once each test was run, all of the found bugs were verified
by re-running them with the appropriate Fuzz Target to ensure
that a crash or leak was replicable. The AddressSanitizer
deduplication tokens described above for each bug found were
inspected to ensure that there were no duplicates. As libFuzzer
is non-deterministic, each test was then repeated five times and
the total number of bugs found in each iteration were averaged.
We ran our experiments on a single module in the stack
of our industry partner, the J2735 Decoding module. J2735 is
a SAE (Society of Automotive Engineers) standard message
set for use primarily by applications utilising the 5.9GHz
Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) for Wireless
Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE) communications
systems [5]. It is the wireless message set used by all of
our industry partner’s applications built for North American
end users, thus making the J2735 decoding module core
infrastructure within the stack.
To illustrate the methodology of our case study, we present
an example of a Fuzz Target created with each of the three
methods for the same target function in our online appendix
at http://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3345339.
VI. RESULTS
In this section, we describe the results of our case study,
separately for the total number of bugs found by each approach
and the bugs found per target.
Fig. 4: Bugs over time
a) Total Bugs: The results presented in Table I show that
the fully automated method of generating Fuzz Targets found
the most bugs by a large margin, finding nearly ten times more
bugs than the annotated method and twenty times more bugs
than the manually created Fuzz Target. Not only does this
method result in the most bugs found, it also takes the least
developer time to implement.
Consider also Figure 4, showing the number of bugs found
over time for each of the three methods. Most bugs tend to
be found shortly after each Fuzz Target begins running. This
is indicative of ‘shallow bugs’, i.e., bugs that can be found
almost right away by Fuzz Testing as they occur on a large
range of inputs. ‘Shallow bugs’ tend to obscure other bugs
because when a bug is found by libFuzzer, the process is
stopped [10]. It is possible to mitigate this by restarting the
Fuzz Target when a bug is found, but this requires initialisation
to be re-performed. Thus, if a large number of the inputs tried
by libFuzzer cause bugs, the efficiency of the tool will be
decreased. However, this is not a limitation of the generated
Fuzz Targets, but rather of libFuzzer, the current primary
mitigation for which is fixing the offending bug to allow Fuzz
Testing to progress.
b) Bugs per Target: As most bugs were found shortly
after a Fuzz Target began running, the amount of time each
target ran for is less of a factor in how many bugs were found.
It is because of this that the relative quality of Fuzz Targets
created by each of the three methods can be estimated by
the number of bugs found per target. As Table I shows, the
handmade Fuzz Target with corpus produces the most bugs
with an average of 4.8 bugs found per run and the fully
automated method finds the least bugs per target at an average
of just 1.42 per run, which is to be expected as the annotated
Fuzz Targets are typically of a higher quality as shown in the
Fuzz Target example in the appendix. The annotated method
produces slightly more bugs per target than the fully automated
method, which would suggest that we would likely see an
even greater number of bugs found if we would annotate
all functions for which targets were generated in the fully
automated method. Although annotating the functions appears
to result only in a slight improvement in bugs found per target,
the time required to perform the annotation is so minimal it
is still worthwhile.
c) False Positives: To determine what proportion of bugs
found were false positives, it was necessary to manually
inspect a sample of the crashing inputs found. For the fully
automated method, we inspected a sample of 15 of the 102
unique bugs found across all runs, as well as all the bugs found
by both the annotated and handmade methods.
In the fully automated method eleven out of the 15 unique
bugs inspected were false positives due to flaws in the gen-
erated Fuzz Target. These flaws were primarily due to the
target generator’s inability to determine when two function
parameters are an array and the corresponding length, i.e., the
length parameter gets set to be longer than the data in the
array, and out of bounds read or write can occur.
In the annotated method, only four of the 13 unique bugs
found were false positives. However, all but one of those false
positives could have been avoided with additional parameters
in the @fuzztest directive to better inform the target
generator about how the target function operates.
For the handmade Fuzz Target, five unique bugs across all
runs were reported, none of which were false positives. How-
ever, three of the reported bugs had very similar deduplication
tokens and were caused by the same underlying bug.
VII. DISCUSSION
The fact that we have been able to generate a Fuzz Target for
a large number of lower level functions, rather than creating
fewer targets for higher level functions, means that we have
reduced the complexity of the code paths that need to be
taken to reach the same underlying bug. This likely means
that nuanced bugs found by a high level Fuzz Target can be
made shallow, and thus easier to find in our automated method
as opposed to standard methods of creating Fuzz Targets.
The primary reason that false positive bugs could be in-
troduced into the code by the generated Fuzz Targets is their
ability to call a target function in a way that is not intended.
This was clearly most prevalent in the fully automated target
generation. False positive leaks also occurred due to the target
function allocating memory without an appropriate Cleanup
parameter being passed to the @fuzztest directive. It is
also possible that the generated Fuzz Targets could find bugs
that, although not false positives as described above, still could
not occur during the normal operation of software. These
‘soft positives’ could include functions that do not sanity
check their own input, such as ensuring pointers are not null,
values are within acceptable ranges, etc., instead relying on
higher level functions to not pass them invalid data. In some
cases, this could result in crashes or leaks being found that
could not occur normally. However, ‘soft positives’ are less
of an issue than false positives, as they are still indicative of
potential flaws in the code and have the possibility of causing
errors in typical usage in the future as the codebase undergoes
additional development.
VIII. LIMITATIONS
This case study considered only a single module within
a single codebase and as such the results found may not
generalise. The module used contained many functions that
the tool was able to generate functional Fuzz Targets for using
either the automated or annotated method, which may not be
the case for all codebases or even for other modules within
the codebase. Currently our tool can only handle function
signatures with only basic types, or structures containing only
basic types. Most of the bugs we found were ‘shallow bugs’
found quickly after a target began running. Because of this,
conducting the same experiments over a longer period of time
could have impacted the results. We evaluate our experiments
primarily using the number of unique bugs found. However,
there is the possibility of the same bug being reported as
multiple, or different bugs being reported as the same. We
have taken care to deduplicate found bugs thoroughly, but
we cannot say with certainty that all duplicates were detected
without manual verification of all found bugs.
IX. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work we evaluated a new method of automatically
generating Fuzz Targets against the conventional method of
creating them by hand. We did this in an attempt to reduce the
amount of developer time required to integrate a Fuzz Testing
solution to help maintain an existing codebase.
For meeting the needs of our industry partner, we consider
the annotated method to be the most effective in terms of
developer time to bugs found, when factoring in the time
taken both to produce annotations and to separate false pos-
itives from true positives. Despite the potential for the fully
automated method to find many more bugs, given the high
false positive rate, it would take much less time to produce
the annotations then it would to verify that the bugs found
were valid and not due to flaws in the generated Fuzz Target.
As long as sufficient time and care is taken in producing
the annotations and ensuring that they are accurate, the false
positive rate of the annotated method can be very low making
it the most effective solution.
In future work, there are several potential improvements
that could be made to the target generation tool in improving
its efficiency, improving the function signature serialisation to
handle more complicated structures, and adding to its ability
to automatically determine how function parameters are used
without the need for a developer to annotate them.
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